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THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
Abstract
This paper discusses conceptual problems of distinguishing "expenditure"
policy from "tax" policy and "deficit" policy. The paper argues that each
of these concepts is ill—defined and does not provide a useful basis for
examining the government's underlying fiscal policies. The fundamentals of
fiscal policy involve changes in marginal incentives, inframarginal intra—
and intergenerational redistribution, and direct government consumption.





New Haven, Connecticut 06520Government expenditures encompass a number of different types of
payments. These include purchases of current consumption goods and services,
transfer nayments to individuals, businesses, non-profit organizations, and
other governmental bodies, gross purchases of financial and tangible assets and
interest payments. Few of these accounting entries correspond to fundamental
economic policy variables that might be perturbed within a well—articulated
model of economic behavior. Consequently, an analysis of the economic affects
ofgovernment expenditures requires identifying those components of government
expenditures that represent more fundamental policy variables and indicating the
relationship of other expenditure components to such variables,
Thefirst sectionof this raper considers the relationship of govern-
ment transferpayments to the tax structure; as pointed out by Surrey (1973) and
Others, from a raicroeconomic perspective, these forms of government expenditures
appear indistinguishable from explicit taxation. Indeed, one could envision
eliminating all such expenditures from the U.S. budget and generating the same
economic environment by simply rewriting the tax code. Alternatively, one could
eliminate most elements of government taxation and achieve identical results by
altering expenditure policy.
Obviously if two economies can have identical aicroeconornic struc-
tures, but report radically different levels of taxation and government
spending, comparisons of economies on the basis of their levels of taxation and
expenditures will provide little, if any, insight. The fact that much of
"expenditure policy" can be subsumed under "tax policy" and vice-versa suggests
the need for a new vocabulary in describing government policies.—2—
Section two raises similar concerns about distinguishing
'expenditures" from "deficits" In the U.S. ,federalgovernment retirement
systems have enormous unfunded liabilities. These unfunded liabilities are
several times the size of official liabilities. Indeed, if one calculates U.S.
government net worth ignoring these and other implicit liabilities, the
government's net worth is positive.1 Between 1960 and 1977 the implicit annual
deficits associated with simply the U.S. social security retirement system
averaged over 7 percent of GNP.2
Ultimately, deficits, whether explicit or implicit, can be identified
as features of government policies that redistribute economic resources across
generations. "Deficits," so defined, can arise from changes in the intergen-
erational distribution of transfer payments or from changes in the intergenera-
tional pattern of taxation. Such changes in the intergenerational structure of
expenditure and taxation can, and often do, occur with no changes in official
reported deficits. As in the case of distinguishing expenditures from taxes,
conventional accounting definitions of deficits provide inadequate and poten-
tially misleading descriptions of underlying government policy.
Section three considers the impact of intragenerational redistribution
on capital formation. This subject has received little attention in recent
years, and virtually no attention from the perspective of neoclassical intertem-
poral growth models. Redistribution from the "rich" to the "poor" is the nomi-
nal objective of many structural features of the U.S. fiscal system .While
much of this redistribution appears to be from the lifetime rich to the lifetime
poor, some of this redistribution is surely from the temporarily rich to the
temporarily poor. Indeed from the perspective of models of infinitely-lived,—3--
altruisticfamilies, "the lifetime rich" and "the lifetime poor" may simply be
temporarily rich and poor representations of essentially equally wealthy
dynastic families.
Redistribution to the temporarily poor as opposed to the permanently
poor seems an important distinction because permanent differences in economic
status are more likely to be correlated with fundamental differences in inter—
temporal preferences and human capital endowments.
In addition to redistributing to the "poor", the U.S. fiscal system
transfers resources between single individuals and married couples, and between
families with children and families without children. A number of "tax" and
"expenditure" systems are involved in this redistribution, and their net impact
remains to be calculated. Since intertemporal consumption and labor supply
decisions are likely to depend on these demographic factors, determining the
size of this redistribution is important for understanding the government's
influence on capital formation and labor supply.
Of the four categories of expenditures listed above, government con-
sumption corresponds most closely to a fundamental policy instrument. Section
four examines the potential effects of government consumption on economic
growth. While conceptually distinct from other fundamental policy variables,
permanent changes in government consumption will necessarily be associated with
changes in the time path of tax receipts net of transfer payments. This conclu—
sion follows from the arithmetic of the government's intertemporal budget
constraint. As a consequence, analysis of the effects of permanent and, indeed,
most temporary changes in government consumption requires specifying those
changes in other policy variables that will finance the new time path of govern—
ment consumption.-4-
Since the effects of changes in government consumption differ
depending on the choice of accommodating changes in other policy variables, one
cannot identify the effects of government consumption per se; just as there is
needfor a new vocabulary to describe the common underlying features of expen-
diture, deficit, and tax policy, there is need for new terminology to charac-
terize necessarily interdependent changes in sets of policy variables.
1 .GovernmentSubsidies and Transfers -TheRelationship tothe Tax Structure.
In the U.S. federal government transfer payments now represent54
percent of total federal expenditure. For state and local governments the
percentage is much smaller, only 9 percent. The comparable figures in 1960 were
35 percent for the federal governmentand 11percentfor state and local
governments.
Currently, the federal government accounts for 92 percent of all
transfer payments by U.S. governments. The bulk of federal transfer payments,
75percent,are direct transfer payments to individuals; 3percentare transfers
toenterprises,and the remaining 22percentare transfer payments to state and
localgovernments.3 Most of the federal transfers to state and local govern-
ments are ultimately paid to individuals in the form of medical, housing and
general welfare support. In 1979, the most recent year with complete data, 46
percent of federal expenditures were direct or indirect (via state and local
governments) transfer payments to individuals.4 Of these expenditures, over
two—thirds were paid to the elderly in the form of old age medical benefits, and
social security, civil service, military, and veterans retirement benefits. The
majority of the remaining funds were paid to the unemployed and disadvantaged..5—
In addition to these explicit government transfer payments, the U.S.
treasury publishes a list of implicit expenditures, entitled tax expenditures,
close to three quarters of which are ascribed to individuals. Tax expenditures
are defined as "revenue losses attributable to provisions of the federal tax
laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction fromgross income
or which provide a special credit, or preferential rate of tax or a deferral of
tax liability."5 Total 1981 tax expenditures of $214 billionmay be compared
with explicit 1981 expenditures of $727 billion.
Roughly speaking, if these exclusions, exemptions, deductions, cre-
dits, etc. had been eliminated from 1981 Federal tax law and explicit payments
had been made in their stead, one might have observed quite similar economic
outcomes, except the government would have reported outlays of over $900 billion
and an additional $200 billion or so in revenues. Simple changes in government
bookkeeping, in this case, could increase reported government expenditures by
close to 25 percent with no necessary economic effects.
One might hope that adding officially reported tax expenditures to
explicit expenditures would provide an adjusted figure for total expenditures,
the value of which could not be altered without affecting economic behavior.
Unfortunately, such is not the case; the definition of tax expenditures is
highly arbitrary. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 defines income tax pro-
visions resulting in tax expenditures as exceptions to the "normal structure" of
the individual and corporate income taxes. The notion of the "normal structure"
of these taxes is subject to multiple interpretations. Indeed, in the 1983
budget, the Accelerated Cost Recovery System rather than straight line depre——6—
ciation was adopted as a "normal" feature of the individual and corporate income
taxes. This change eliminated approximately $12.3 billion dollars in tax
expenditures •6
Even if the "normal structures" of the U.S. individual andcorporate
income taxes were unambiguous, the choice of these tax systems as the base
against which to measure deviations is ciuite arbitrary. The current structure
of U.S. taxation is better described as a hybrid mixture of wage and consump-
tion taxation than as a system of individual and corporate income taxes. Use of
either a wage or consumption tax as the "normal" tax structure from which to
assess deviations would result in radically different estimates of tax expen-
ditures, and radically different estimates of adjusted total expenditures.
The inability to produce an economically meaningful definition of
government expenditures as distinct from the tax system is an immediate implica-
tion of microeconomic theory. The traditional theory of households making con-
sumption and labor supply decisions and firms making production decisions rela-
tes behavior to endowments and marginal incentives. Endowments and marginal
incentives are affected by both "expenditure" and "tax" policies, and, in most
cases, particular endowments and marginal incentives associated with
"expenditure" policy can be replicated using "tax" policy, and vice—versa.
Social security's transfer payments to retirees between 65 and 72 pro-
vides a good illustration. Although there is an on-going debate as to the exact
marginal work incentives associated with social security's earnings test and
benefit formula, one simple model is that workers between age 65 and 72 receive
benefit payments that are reduced by 50 cents for every dollar above the social
security earnings ceiling, currently $6,000. The structural features of these-7-
social security expenditures could be replicated under the individual income tax
by providing a refundable tax credit equal in magnitude to each elderly
taxpayer's social security benefit and then simply taxing at an additional 50
percent rate all labor earnings in excess of $6,000 and below twice the credit.
Interestingly, the U.S. earned income tax credit, a provision of "tax policy,"
is structured essentially in this manner. Workers with labor earnings above
$5,000 who have children receive a $500 tax credit which is reduced by 12.5 per-
cent for every dollar earned between $6,000 and $10,000.
In principle, one could envision redesigning the U.S. tax code to
incorporate the 46 percent of federal expenditures paid as transfers to indivi-
duals. If the redesign preserved current endowments and marginal incentives,
one would expect little, if any, change in economic behavior. Such a transfer
expenditure-.equivalent redesign of the tax code, while of little practical
importance, would be an extremely educational exercise.
For the U.S. a transfer expenditure -equivalenttax code would reveal
effective income tax schedules that differ by age, sex, marital status, and
number of children. For the young and middle age, these schedules would involve
refundable tax credits, extremely high marginal tax rates at low levels of labor
earnings, moderate tax rates at middle earnings levels, and higher tax rates
thereafter. The high tax rates at low levels of earnings reflect the combined
earnings test of various federal welfare programs including Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC), Food Stamps (calculated on a cash—equivalent
basis), low income housing, and Medicaid (medical care to the poor, also calcu.-
lated on a cash—equivalent basis). At certain low levels of labor earnings the
combined marginal tax rates of these programs easily exceed 100 percent.-8-
Indeed, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 raised AFDC'S implicit tax
rate,byitself,from 66 percent to100percent.
Thenew tax schedules would also exhibit sharp k±nks and discon—
tinuities. Kinks would occur at each point that the benefits of one of the
welfare programs or of the earned income tax credit were totally recaptured.
Beyond that point that program's marginal tax ratewould no longer affect the
worker.Discontinui-ties arise in thecase of Medicaid where a poorindividual
orfamily forfeits all eligibility for medical assistance under this program if
their eligibility for AFDC terminates, i.e., if they earn above a specified
dollaramount.
The transfer expenditure—equivalent tax schedules would differ by sex,
marital status, and number of children because welfare benefits andmarginaltax
ratesat particular levels of earnings are functions of these variables. These
tax schedules would differ for the elderly because of their potential eligibi—
lity for Social Security benefits and supplemental security income.
For those who consider steadily increasing marginal tax rates a sine—
qua-non for an equitable tax system, the presentation of these transfer
expenditure—equivalent tax schedules might change their view of the degree of
equityin U.S. fiscal affairs. These schedules would also shed light on the
currentU.S. debate concerning implementation of a flat tax. Thos who object
to such a scheme because marginal rates are constant rather than rising with
income should be cognizant of the fact that effective marginal rates under
current law fall rather than rise over significant ranges of earnings.
A figurative rewriting of the U.S. tax code to include federal
transfer payments to individuals would also clarify the difference between the—9-
currentU.S. welfare system and recent negative income tax proposals designed to
replace the welfare system. The negative income tax, in its simplest form,
involves an identical dollar payment to all adults. Positive earnings are taxed
at a constant rate until the net grant is zero. After the net grant has been
taxed to zero, additional earnings are taxed under the federal income tax. The
debate in the U.S. concerning the negative income tax has preceeded with little,
if any, comparison of this proposal with the tax credits and effective tax rate
schedules confronting the poor under the existing system. Such a comparison
indicates that the negative income tax represents simply a modification rather
than a radical departure from the underlying U.S. transfer-tax system. The pri-.
mary difference between a negative income tax and our current system is the use
of a single tax credit and tax rate schedule for all individuals regardless of
demographic characteristics. There are valid arguments for and against cate-
gorical tax treatment, but given a decision on this issue, there remains the
question of setting equitable and efficient credits and tax rates. For many
demographic groups in the U.S., the combined implicit tax schedules of multiple,
independently run welfare programs generate quite strange, and, presumably,
highly inefficient, transfer expenditure—equivalent tax schedules.
Transfer expenditure-equivalent tax schedules would also provide
alternative ways of describing simultaneous changes in "expenditure' and "tax"
policy. For example, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 in combination with
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 raised marginal tax rates at low
income levels end lowered marginal tax rates at medium and higher income levels
from the perspective of transfer expenditure—equivalent tax schedules.-10-
2. The Relationship Between Expenditures and Deficits.
In 1979 U.S. federal expenditures on social security, railroad retire-
ment, military and veteran retirement, and civil serviceretirementtotalled
$141 billion, over a quarter of the federal budget. These expenditures are
financed on an unf.mded or "pay-as-you-go" basis in which taxes from primarily
young and middle aged workers are aid in the form of benefits primarily to
elderly individuals.While these government programs represent the major
source of retirement income for the majority of Americans, virtually no money
was specially saved by the U.S. government to meet these benefit payments.
According to recent estimates of actuaries of the social security, civil ser-
vice, and military retirement systems, the trust fund needed under these programs
to fully fund net benefit commitments to current adults is $3.5 to $6.5
7 trillion,depending on actuarial assumptions.Restating this fact, under
current law, the U.S. adult population holds implicit I.O.U.s on the Federal
government that range from $3.5 to $6.5 trillion.
If it so desired, the U.S. government could transform these unofficial
I.O.U.s into official liabilities by simply issuing each adult a non—negotiable
bond with a face value equal to the expected present value of net future bene-
fits. Each year as the expected present value of net benefits changed for the
adult population, the government could exchange the previously issued non—
negotiable bond for a new non—negotiable bond with the revised face value.
While nothing except government bookkeeping would be changed by handing the
public these pieces of paper, the educational value of such an exercise could be
quite large. Overnight, the government's official liabilities would increase by
a factor of 3 to 6. If the government simultaneously reported an historic time-11-
series indicating what the face value of these non—negotiable bonds would have
been had they been issued in the past, one could calculate new official values
for total past government deficits. Such an exercise would indicate that the
budget deficits projected for 1983, 1984, and 1985, arising from recent U.S.
legislation, are minor relative to the estimates of total deficits experienced in
the past. These new figures would cast significant doubt on the notion that
near—term projected deficits, as officially defined, are responsible for the
high real interest rates now prevailing in the U.S.
Presumably, such a redefinition of official government liabilities
would raise the question of classifying other implicit commitments to future
expenditures as government debt. If one is willing to label implicit promises
to pay future retirement and medicare benefits official liabilities, why not
include implicit expenditure commitments to maintain the national parks, to
defend the country, or to provide minimum sustainance to the poor.
An embroiled debate on the appropriate definition of government debt
would likely lead some exasperated official to suggest eliminating the
reporting, and, indeed, the concept of government debt entirely and simply rely
on taxation. This official might also argue that one could switch from
"deficit" to "tax" finance with no affect whatsoever on theeconomy. Under the
assumption of perfect capital markets he (she) would be quite correct. Rather
than raise additional funds by issuing treasury securities, the government could
simply levy "a head" tax per adult promising to pay each adult in the following
year an amount equal to the tax plus interest on the tax. If the adult died
during the year the payment would be made to his or her estate. Those too poor
to pay the head tax could borrow against next year's transfer payment to acquire
the required funds.—12-
Under this scenario the government would annually levy head taxes
equalto what is currently reported as the official debt. In addition, the
government would annually make transfers to each adult equal to the prior year's
headtax plus interest. The new official government books would show taxes
equal to expenditures and zero deficits.
Like government "expenditures," an economically meaningful definition
ofgovernment deficits is simplynot to be found. Again, micro—economicsprovi-
des an immediate explanation. Neoclassical growth models involving government
policycontain fourbasic components; these are household intertemporal pre-
ferences, household interteaiporal budget constraints, production technologies,
and the government's intertemporal budget constraint. Obviously, neither uti-
lity functions nor production functions involve government "deficits."
Household budget constraints do involve parameters of the fiscal system such as
tax (negative subsidy) rates, subsidy (negative tax) rates, and infra—marginal
net taxes (net transfers); but, as mentioned, examination of these budget
constraints does not even provide a way to distinguish "expenditures" per se.
One could, of course, combine certain terms labelled "expenditures" with certain
terms labelled "taxes" and call these "deficits" or "debt"; however, any such
definition of deficits or debt is arbitrary and affects neither the household 's
maximization problem nor the predictions of the model,
The last hope for a meaningful definition of government debt lies in
the government's intortemporal budget constraint. Like the household's
constraint, the government's budget constraint can be reexpressed in various
ways. The U.S. government's current fiscal taxonomy suggests the following
description of the constraint: The present value of future taxes (as defined in—13-
theNational Accounts), olus the present value of increases in the stock of base
money, plus the market value of government financial and tangible assets must be
sufficient to cover both the present value of government expenditures (as
defined in the National Accounts, but excluding interest payments) and the
market value of official government debt (excluding debt held by the Federal
Reserve).
In this expression gross official U.S.debtat market value appears
explicitly on the right hand side of the equation. For the U.S. this figure
equaled approximately $850 billion in 1980.8 While this is one way to write the
equation, one could equally well subtract the financial assets of the government
from both sides of the equation and end up with a figure for net financial debt
on the right hand side. This figure in 1980 equalled approximately $400
billion.9If one subtracted tangible as well as financial assets, one could
define government debt as gross liabilities less gross assets; for 1980 the
estimated value of this concept of debt is negative, approximately —$300
10 billion.
These manipulations have already produced three different definitions
of debt without even mentioning unfunded social security and other federal
retirement liabilities. To include these implicit liabilities in the definition
of debt in a manner that accords with the accounting practices of the social
security, civil service, and military retirement actuaries, one need only com-
bine those right—hand side expenditures that correspond to future benefit
payments to current adults with those terms that correspond to the future
contributions of current adults to federal retirement programs.—14—
Afifth way to rewrite the budget constraint in which debt and asset
terms per se would not appear is to express the government's gross official debt
as the present value of future interest plus principle payments and to express
the government's assets as the present value of capital income plus receipts
from the sale of these assets. This version of the constraint involves simply
an equality in present value between all future government receipts and all
future government expenditures.
While this fifth formulation of the government's budget constraint
defines away deficits, the economic problem typically associated with deficits,
namely their deleterious affect on capital formation, cannot be defined away. A
variant of this fifth expression clarifies the government's fundamental
intergenerational redistribution policies that can affect capital formation.
The fifth expression can be rewritten by combining all taxes and transfer terms
on the left—hand side of the equation and leaving government consumption expen-
ditures on the right—hand side. The budget constraint now appears as an
equality between the present value of net taxes and the present value of govern-
ment consumption. The annual payments that are combined to form the present
value of net taxes can be indexed by various socio—economic characteristics of
the taxpayer (transferee). For purposes of discussing the conventional
questions of deficits and capital formation, age is the critical variable for
indexing annual net tax payments.
To isolate pure intergenerational redistribution from changes in
marginal incentives, one can assume that the annual net tax payments made by
(received by) particular cohorts are lump sum payments. The assumption that
government consumption is zero further simplifies the discussion. Under these—15—
conditions the government is free to choose any sequence of lump sum net taxes
levied on particular cohorts in particular years, provided the present value of
these net taxes is zero. Since the sequence of intergenerational net taxes may
affect capital formation, and, therefore, interest rates, the zero present value
of lump suni net taxes must be consistent with the paths of interest rates they
engender.While this general equilibrium requirement places limitations on the
scopeof intergenerational redistribution, there remains an infinite set of
sequences of cohort—specific net taxes from which the government canchoose.
Theset includes conventional, "deficit—financed", "tax"cuts in which lower net
taxesin the near term are offset by higher net taxes in the future. Within
this framework the introduction of an unfundedretirementprogram is modeled
as a reduction in the time path of lump sum net taxes paid by those cohorts who
are old during the initiation of the program. To payforthe lower net taxes
oninitial elderly generations, net taxes on young and future generations must
be increased.
In the case of the U.S. Social Security System, the higher net taxes
on the young and future generations are imposed in a subtle manner; young and
future generations are required to make payroll "tax" contributions to the
system; in exchange, they are implicitly promised future Social Security bene-
fits. If the present value of theseSocial Security benefits is less than the
presentzalue of "tax contributions, the young and future generationsexperience
largernet taxes over their lifetimes. Such increases in the net taxesofyoung
and future generations are predicted by general equilibrium growth models
provided the economy's return on capital exceeds its rate of population plus
productivitygrowth.—16—
While the U.S. Social Security System combined changes in convention-
ally defined expenditures with changes in conventially defined taxes, "deficit"
policy can be effected simply by changing the age distribution of conventionally
defined expenditures. Actually, determining ex—post whether the government
adjusted conventionally defined taxes or conventionally defined expenditures in
response to the introduction of a new fiscal policy is quite difficult. For
example, in the U.S., Medicare payments to the elderly may have been financed by
smaller government scholarships and loan subsidies to students, by reduced
mortgage subsidies to young home buyers, or by a variety of other expenditures
made to, or on behalf of, the young and middle aged. While it 1may be hard to
convince legislators that they are effectively running deficits when they decide
to support programs like Medicare at the expense of programs like school
lunches, such is indeed the case.
The economic consequences of lump sum intergenerational redistribution
depend on the interteruporal preferences of society. In the strict Modigliani—
Brumberg (1954) life cycle model particular cohorts are concerned with their own
lifetime consumption and leisure and that of their young children. Their welfare
is totally independent of the welfare of their far distant decendents or,
indeed, the welfare of their children once they have reached adulthood.
In life cycle economies marginal propensities to consume and enjoy
leisure in the current period arising from changes in lifetime resources depend
on the cohorts' age. For cohorts not yet born, these marginal propensities are
obviously zero. For cohorts currently alive, marginal consumption andleisure
propensities steadily rise with age. Cohorts at the very end of their lives
will immediately consume any net transfer they receive, because they are con-
cerned solely with their last year's consumption and leisure. Younger cohorts-17-
will "spend" on consumption and leisure only a fraction of any net lifetime
transfer in the current year, saving the remainder to "purchase" additional
consumption and leisure in the future. This smoothing of "purchases" of
consumption and leisure over multiple periods results in lower marginal consump-
tion and leisure propensities the greater the number of remaining years of life.
In such an economy, lump sum net transfers to the old from the young and from
unborn, future cohorts will raise aggregate consumption and leisure and, there-
fore, lower national output and national saving. In addition to inheriting
larger lifetime net tax burdens, young and future generations may be further
adversely affected by the general equilibrium consequences of changes in
national capital formation. The decline in capital formation will likely be
associated with higher real returns to capital and lower real returns to labor.
Since the elderly are capital rich, while the young and future generation are
endowed primarily with human capital, these general equilibrium changes in fac-
tor returns will accentuate rather than mitigate the partial equilibrium changes
in the intergenerational distribution of welfare.
The principle alternative specification of preferences in dynamic
neoclassical models (Barro 1974) assumes living generations consider the welfare
of their decendents in making current economic decisions. Living generations,
in these models, influence the welfare of future generations by altering their
own intergenerational transfers. In these models changes in the intergenera-
tional pattern of government lump sum net tax payments have no effect on the
economy (assuming perfect capital markets), because changes in private intergen-
erational transfers offset the government's redistribution of resources across
generations. Unlike life cycle models, dynamic altruistic models predict zero-18-
economic effects from changes in the generational distribution of conventionally
defined expenditures, assuming such changes do not alter marginal incentives.
Determining which of these two specifications of intertemporal pre-
ferences best describes economic behavior is critical for evaluating "the
economic effects of government expenditures." Simulation models of unfunded
social security expenditures in life cycle economies predict a 15 to 25 percent
long—run reduction incapitalformation when calibrated using U.S. data
(Kotlikoff (1979), Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1981 )).Forfuture generations the
associatedreduction in welfare is equivalent to a 5to 10 percentreduction in
lifetime resourcesin a world of no social security.
Some perspective on the size of these implicit deficits is gained by
considering the comparable explicit deficit required to produce a 15 to 25 per-
cent reduction in the economy's long run capital stock. Findings in Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1980) suggest that a 10 to 20 year cut in income tax rates of
roughly 15 percent would generate similar consequences for capital formation.
The accumulation of official debt associated with such prolonged tax cuts is
equal in value to between 25 and 50 percent of the economy's long run capital
stock.
Martin Feldatein has pioneered theoretical and empirical research on
the effects of unfunded intergenerational transfers oncapitalformation. His
initial estimates (Feldstein (1974)) that the U.S. Social Security System
reduced U.S. savings by almost 40 percent stimulated a series of additional stu-
dies of this subject (Barro (1978), Darby (1978), Leimer and Leanoy (1980),
Feldstein (1980), Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1981)). Subsequent results have been
mixed. Much of the problem in precisely determining the effects of intergenera-
tional transfers in national saving reflects the lack of cohort—specific time—19—
seriesdata on consumption, net taxes, net worth, and human capital. If such
data were available one could test whether the consumption of one cohort was
significantly influenced by the econonlic resources of other cohort, or, equiva-
lently, whether aggregate household consumption depends on the intercohort
distribution of resources.
3.Intra—generationalRedistribution and Capital Formation
Thegovernment 's choices in redistributing resources among different
members of the same cohort are also constrained by its intertemporal budget. To
consider the policy options available with respectto such redistribution, it is
convenientto index lump sum net tax payments not only by the household's age,
but also by its socio—economic characteristics. One characteristic of par-
ticular interest in the household's endowment of human capital. Households that
are endowed with a lower than average level of human capital and, therefore,
receive lower than average wages per unit time, can be classified as permanently
poor within a life cycle model. Assuming their progeny are also endowed with
less than the average amount of human capital, such households could be labelled
permanentlypoor from the perspective of growthmodels with "infinitely—lived"
altruistic families.
Under the assumption of perfect capital markets, one can construct
examples for either life cycle or "infinitely—lived" altruistic economies in
whichredistribution from the permanently rich to the permanently poor has no
impacton national saving, output, or any other macro—economic variables. The
Cobb—Doublas utility function is one set of preferences that generates this
result. For this utility function the marginal propensity to consume out of
lump sum transfers (taxes) is independent of the wage rate. In addition,-20-
although the marginal change in actual labor supply arising from a given lump
sum transfer (tax) depends on the wage rate, the marginal change in human capi-
tal supply (actual labor supply measured in effective units of human capital) is
independent of the wage rate. A lump sum tax on high wage workers lowers their
consumption by an amount equal to the consumption increase of low wage workers
receiving the lump sum transfer. In addition, the high wage workers increase
their labor supply, but by less than the low wage workers lower their labor
supply. Since high wage workers are more productive per unit time than low wage
workers, these changes are consistent with a constant effective supply of labor
to the economy.
Thereis, of course, no reason to expect the rich and the poor to have
identical preferences, let alone identical Cobb—Douglas preferences. If, for
example,both the rich and the poor have Cobb—Douglas utility functions, but the
rate of time preference for the poor exceeds that for the rich, the poor will
exhibit greater marginal propensities to consume than the rich out of transfers.
Lump sum redistribution to the poor will, in this case, raise current consump-
tion and lower national saving. In addition to the increase in consumption
there is a decrease in effective labor supply in this example, and therefore, in
national output. Thisdecline in output further reduces national saving.
Assumingthis redistribution is on—going, there will be a permanent reduction in
the economy's ratio of capital to effective labor supply in life cycle models
and, at least, a temporary reduction in "infinitely—lived", altruistic growth
models.
The "poor" and "rich" may also differ fundamentally with respect to
the inclusion of the consumption and leisure of future generations in their
intertemporal utility. If, for example, the "poor" have life cycle preferences,—21-
whilethe "rich" have infinitely-lived, altruistic preferences, transfer.s bet-
ween these two types of families will affect aggregate saving and labor supply
even if both types of families have intertemporal utility functions that are
identical in form.
In this setting, the "poor", life—cycle families receiving transfers
may characteristically have lower marginal propensities to consume than the
"rich", infinitely-lived, altruistic families makingthetransfers. Consider,
for example, the case of an on—going lump sumtax onall 'rich", young workers
coupledwith a lump sum transfer to all "poor", young workers. The "rich",
young altruistic workers share their reduction in resources with older family
members currently alive. Since the altruistic family will face anidenticaltax
eachyear in the future, the reduction in current consumption could plausibly
equalthe tax, ignoring laborsupply responses. For the "poor" life cycle
worker, the increase in resources is spread over consumption in old age as well
as consumption whenyoung. Hence, the "poor" young workers will presumably
increase their current consumption by less than the amount of the tax.
Inthisexample, the consumption of "poor" old life cycle households
isunaffected by taxes and transfers on the young. The effects of redistribu-
tion from "infinitely lived", altruistic households to life cycle households
would, however, be considerably different if the lump sum transfer was paid to
old life cycle families rather than to young life cycle families. As described
in the previous section, old life cycle families have larger marginal propen-
sities to consume than young life cycle families. Since the impact of
intragenerational redistribution depends on the ages of the taxpayers and trans—
ferees receiving and making payments, it appears impossible to clearly
distinguish the effects of intra as opposed to intergenerational transfers.—22-
Similar differences in marginal propensities to consume both goods and
leisure can arise because of family size and the age distribution of family mem-
bers. Transfers from young single adults with no children to young married
couples withchildrenin a life cycle model provides a good example. Young,
married, life cycle couples presumably include the consumption of their young
childrenin their utiity function. In comparison with single individuals,
couples with children are likely to consume a greater fraction of their lifetime
resources at young ages because of this provision for their children.
Consequently, such families should exhibit larger marginal propensities to con—
sumeoutof transfers than those hypothetical single individuals making the
transfers. Both the number and ages of children of transferees will determine
marginal family consumption propensities at different ages of the parents. An
ongoing policy of redistribution from single, childless individuals to married
couples with children can generate permanent reductions in a life cycle
economy's degree of capital intensity in much the same way on—going redistribu-
tion from the young to the old alters capital intensity. While the quantitative
impact of U.S. intergenerational transfers on U.S. saving remains in doubt,
there is at least widespread awareness of the size of the intergenerational
transfers involved. In the case of intragenerational transfers, no comparable
research has yet been conducted to even measure the extent of this form of
redistribution.4. Economic Effects of Government Consumption.
Between 1960 and 1980 the ratio of U.S. federal governmentexpen-
ditures to the net national product rose by over 30 percent. Surprisingly, this
increase in federal outlays has been associated with a decline in the share of
net national product consumed by the federal government, Federal government
consumption, defined as expenditures on non—durabies and services, averaged 8.3
percent of net national product in the 1960s and 7.0 percent in the 19708.11
Consumption by state and local governments, on the other hand, increased from
8.4 to 11.9 percent of net national product.
As implied by the government's intertenporal budget constraint,
current increases in government consumption must be financed either by larger
current or future net taxes or lower levels of future government consumption.
The effects of changes in government consumption on the privateeconomy depend
both on the substitutability of government for private consumption ann thepar-
ticular method used to finance changes in government consumption.
One can easily construct a model in which government consumption has
no affect whatsoever on the economy. Such a situation would arise if government
and private consumption were perfect substitutes, if government consumption were
inframarginal, and if lump sum taxes were levied on the specific recipients of
government consumption expenditures. In such a world, permanent or temporary
changes in government consumption would alter private consumption dollar for
dollar leaving total national output, consumption, and saving unchanged.
An alternative assumption is that government consumption provides the
private sector with either no additional utility or that the additional utility
afforded is completely independent of private consumption and leisure decisions.-24—
Inthis case the impact on private decisions of government consumption depends
entirely on any associated changes in the intra and intergenerational time path
of net taxation.
In the simple case of an economy characterized by a single,
'infinitely—lived" altruistic family, any increase in the present value of
government consumption will alter current levels of private consumption and
leisure, since only the level, not the timing of the associated higher net taxa—
tion (assuming it islump sum) affects household behavior. An announcement,
today, for example, of a future permanent reduction in government consumption
will lead to more current private consumption, and less current labor supply as
households begin immediately to spend their anticipated future tax cuts. While
national saving will fall in the short run, additively separable representations
of this type of utility function imply that the economy will eventually return
to its former capital-labor ratio and its former factor returns. The new steady
state equilibrium will feature a smaller capital stock and a smaller supply of
labor, but a potentially higher level of private consumption. If the permanent
reduction in government consumption occurs immediately rather than several years
in the future, the economic transition will be somewhat different, but the same
steady state will ultimately prevail.
The fact that decreases (increases) in rates of government consumption
are associated in these models with a decline (increases) in long—run capital
formation contradicts the view that government consumption crowds out invest—
ment. In the case of life cycle models permanent increases in government
consumption are also consistent with increased capital formation if the asso-
ciated new time path of net taxation is appropriately chosen. In particular,—25—
increased government consumption financed by lump sum taxes on the old can pro-
duce a reduction in private consumption that exceeds the increase in public con-
sumption. In a simple two period model, for example, the consumption of the old
falls by the full amount of the tax, but the consumption of the young declines
and their labor supply increases in anticipation of neeting the additional tax
burden when old.
If the lump sum tax levied to finance the greater government consump-
tion is assessed on the young, the traditional crowding out of private capital
will occur. In this case, the youngabsorbpart of the higher tax burden by
reducing their consumption when old. The reduction in consumption when young
and the increase in the labor supply of the young is typically insufficient to
offset the decrease in public saving.
The difficulty of determining the impact of government consumption in
the absence of specifying precisely the concommitant changes in taxation is no
less true for distortionary taxation than for lump sum taxation. Auerbach and
Kotlikoff(1980) simulate the extent of crowding out in a life cycle model in
which a proportional income tax is used to finance government consumption. They
find that long run crowding out of investment by permanent increases in govern-
ment consumption is 21 cents for every dollar of government consumption if the
government maintains a balanced budget; it is 32 cents if the government keeps
tax rates constant for 5 years and balances its budget (inclusive of interest
payments on the accumulated debt) thereafter. If tax rates are held constant
for 20 years and raised, thereafter, to balance the budget, the crowding out of
investment is 80 cents per dollar of additional government consumption.—26—
Conclusion
This paper has stressed conceptual problems of distinguishing
"expenditure" policy from "tax" policy and "deficit" policy. Expenditures,
taxes, and deficits are each ill—defined concepts and do not provide a useful
basis for examining the government's underlying fiscal policies. The fundamen—
tals of fiscal policy involve changes in marginal incentives, inframarginal
intra and intergenerational redistribution, and direct government consumption.
However, even this characterization of the government's fiscal instruments is
problematic because these "instruments" cannot, in general, be independently
applied or separately defined: government-instituted changes in marginal
incentives typically involve inframarginal redistribution; intergenerational
transfers often have affects that could equally well be attributed to intr.age—
nerational transfers; and most changes in government consumption require
simultaneously altering marginal incentives and/or engaging in inframarginal
redistribution of resources across and within generations.
Descriptions of fiscal policy in terms of its affects on marginal
incentives, its pattern of net transfers, and its direct absorption of resources
provides more insight than the traditional classification of "expenditure",
"taxes" and "deficits"; but this new vocabularly also invites aissuse if the
necessarily interdependent application of these policies is not fully
understood and articulated in predicative statements about government interven-
tion in the private sector.-27-
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